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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IK THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF JEROLD E. THOl\fPSON,
to change the Point of diverson and
place of use of 4.0 c.f.s. acquired by
Application No. 16833; Change A pplicacation X o. a-2017.
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•
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'\TATSON, STATE ENGINEER .OF
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants and .Ap·pellants.

Brief of Appellants
·STATEMENT OF CASE
This proceeding originated in the office of the State
Engineer of Utah. The appellant, Jerold E. Thompson,
filed in that office an application to change the point of
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diversion and ·place of use of underground water applied
for in application No. 16833, which application was made
by one Martin C. Hintzen to ap:propriate four cubic feet
per second from a well to be drilled on the Southeast
Quarter of Section 8, Township 35 South, of Range 16
West, Salt Lake Meridian in Iron County, Utah.
The application to change the place of use was made
by the appellant Jerold E. Thompson, as assignee of
Martin C. Hintzen. Such appJication is designated as
change application No. a-2017.
The respondent John C. McGarry filed an objection
to the application of appellant Jerold E. Thompson upon
the grounds that he, John C. McGarry, was the owner
and holder of application No. 16833, as the assignee of
~"fartin C. Hintzen.
The state engineer granted the application of Jerold
E. Thompson and made its order permitting him to
change the place of use to another tract of land which
the wife of Jerold E. Thompson was purchasing from
the state of Utah.
The respondent John C. McGarry prosecuted an
appeal from the order of the State Engineer to the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District in and for Iron
County, Utah. Upon pleadings filed in such District
Court a trial was had and the District Court reversed the
order of the State Engineer and held that John C. McGarry was the owner of the Hintzen application and that
the appellant Jerold E. Thompson was not the owner of
such application and therefore was not entitled to change
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the point of diversion and use of the water applied for
by the application No. 16833 made by Martin C. Hintzen.
Jerold E. Thompson and Ed. H. Watson, State- Engineer of the State of Utah prosecute separate appeals to
this court from the judgment made and entered by the
District Court of Iron County. This brief is filed for and
on behalf of both of the appellants.
There is no substantial conflict in the evidence which
establishes the following facts :
lTnder date of July 21st, 1945 a Uniform Real Estate
Contract was entered into (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) which
contains, among others, the follo,ving provisions:

J

"This agreement made in duplicate this 21st
day of July, A.D. 1945 by and between ~Tohn C.
~IcGarry, his assignee or assigns of Cedar City,
Utah, hereinafter designated as the seller and M.
C. Hintzen, hereinafter designated as the Buyer
of Los Angeles, California, Witnesseth: That the
seller for the consideration herein mentioned
agrees to sell and convey to the buyer and the
buyer for the consideration herein mentioned
agrees to purchase the following described real
property situated in the County of Iron, State of
Utah, to wit:
The South 100 acres of the South East
Quarter (SE%) of Section eight (8) Township 35 South, Range 16 W·est, S.L.M.
It is agreed that in the event the buyer or
any assignee or assignees shall make application
to appropriate water or shall procure a certificate
of appropriation to appropriate water from wells
located upon said •p:remises and said buyer or as-
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signee or assignees shall thereafter default in this
contract the seller shall immediately become the
assignee of any such application or applications
and the State Engineer of the State of Utah is
hereby authorized to recognize said seller as· the
assignee of any such application and in the event
a certificate of appropriation has issued to the
buyer the water rights hereunder shall be considered as appurtenant to the said premises and
in the event of default the title thereto shall immediately pass to the seller."
So far as a;p,pears that contract was never recorded.
Mr. Hintzen paid the full purchase price of the property
as provided for in the contract. (Tr. 8) Mr. McGarry
never gave a deed to Hintzen to the property. At the time
that the above mentioned contract was entered into Hintzen filed the water right app,lication which forms the
subject matter of this controversy but so far as appears
nothing was done by Hintzen to dig a well pursuant to
the application. The application to appropriate water so
filed by Martin C. Hintzen was never, so far as the record shows, approved by the State Engineer, (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 5) except by the approval of the exchange application filed by appellant.
In the latter part of Fehruary, 1946 McGarry exchanged 80 acres of the 100 acres of land described in
the Uniform Sales Contract above mentioned for another 80_ acres of land and at the same time received from
Hintzen a purported assignment of the ap~plication involved in this controversy. ( Tr. 10). The assignment however was not recorded nor filed in the office of the State
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Engineer. (Tr. 4) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.) The assignment was, however, filed for record in the office of the
County Recorder of Iron County, Utah on November 2,
1946. Mr. Hintzen ren1ained on the property described in
the Unifor1n Sales Contract until ~fay or June, 1946. (Tr.
8) The Uniform Sales Contract between McGarry and
Hintzen was merely handed back to McGarry and McGarry gave Hintzen a deed to another 80 acres of land.
(Tr. 10)
During the first part of April, 1946 the appellant,
Jerold E. Thompson, entered into -an agreement with
Martin C. Hintzen where.by ltlartin C. Hintzen agreed· to
assign to Thompson the application to app;ropriate water
here involved and Thompson agreed to remove the brush
from 80 acres of land for Hintzen. Pursuant to such contract Thompson during the first part of Ap,ril, 1.946 did
remove the brush as agreed. (Tr. 11) The reasonable
value of such labor was $10.00 per acre. (Tr. 13 and Tr.
30) In consideration for the labor in clearing the brush
from the 80 acres of land Mr. Hintzen assigned to appellant Thompson the application to ap'P'ropriate water
which is involved in this controversy. (Tr. 11 and 12)
(and defendants Exhibit "A")
Prior to the time appellant Th{)mpson entered into
the agreement with Hintzen he, Thompson, went to the
office of the State Engineer of Utah for the purpose of
ascertaining how he might ,acquire a water right. He had
recently come to Utah from California and was not
familiar with the laws touching the procedure necessary
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to be followed to secure a right to drill wells for the purpose of developing water for irigation purposes. He secured from the ·office of the State Engineer the names of
a number of people who might be the holders of a water
right application that could be purchased. Among the
names:.of the persons which was given to Mr. Thompson
was that of Mr. Hintzen (Tr. 12). The appellant, Thompson, contacted Mr. Hintzen and entered into the agreeme,nt with him to remove the brush from the eight acres
of land for the water right application here brought in
question. Under date of April 6, 1946 Martin C. Hintzen
and his :wJfe, Margarite C. Hintzen, assigned app~~ication
16833 to appellant Jerold E. Thompson and on April 16,
1946 the assignm·ent was filed in the office of the State
Engineer. (Defendants' Exhibit "A"). The State Engineer granted the change application on March 3, 1947,
v1hich approval required that work must he commenced
within six months.- after the ap~proval date and diligently
prosecuted to completion. (Defendants' Exhibit '' C' ')
So far as appears the as~ignment of the water right application to the respondent John C. McGarry, nor a copy
thereof, has never been filed in the Office of the State Engineer of Utah.
Soon after the State Engineer ap·proved the exchange
application appellant Thompson caused a well to be
drilled on the land which his wife was purchasing from
the State of Utah and the well was finished on the last
of May, 1947. (Tr. 15) Mr. ~hompson expended $1975.00
in having the well drilled. (Tr. 16) Mr. Thom~pson did
not know of any claim of Mr. McGarry to the water filing
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in dispute until he received a notice of the p~rotest which
was on December 20, 21 or 22nd, 1946. (Tr. 17)
At the time 1\fr. Hintzen agreed to make and when
he did make the assignment to Thompson·of the application to appropriate water Hintzen stated that he still
owned the filing, that he paid for and that he still owned
a portion of the ground where the original application
designated the well should be drilled. (Tr. 17) Mr. Hintzen told appellant Thompson that he, Hintzen, had turned
back to 1\IcGarry ·eighty acres of the land which he had
purchased from respondent McGarry but that he Hintzen
retained 20 acres of the land which he had originally purchased from McGarry. Hintzen further informed appellant Thompson that he Hintzen was going to have his
father and mother come over here from Germany and
that they were going to live on the twenty acres retained
by Hintzen. (Tr. 19) Mr. Thompson further testified
that he was not familiar with the amount of water necessary to irrigate land. ( Tr. 20)
The foregoing is in ·substance the evidenee upon
which the trial court found the issues raised by the pleadings in favor of the respoJ?-dent and against the appellant.
ASSIGNMENTS O·F ERROR
The appellant Jerold E. Thompson assigns the following as errors upon which he relies for a reversal of
the judgment a:p,pealed from and for a mandate of this
court directing the trial court to enter a judgment in
favor of the appellant Jerold E. Thompson awarding
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to him all water rights that he might acquire under exchange application a-2017.
1. The trial court erred in making the parts of its
findings numbered 4 to 5 wherein it is in effect found that
the plaintiff is the owner of application numbered 16833
to appropriate 4 cubic feet per second of water. That
such findings are without support in the evidence and
are contrary to the evidence in that at the tin1e l\iartin
C. Hintzen executed the purported assignment of such
water right aplication the same had not been approved
by the State Engineer and the said Martin C. Hintzen
had no assignable interest in such application. (pages
2 and 3 of complaint. R. 33-34.
2. The trial court erred in making that p~art of its
finding numbered 13 wherein it is found: "that the said
Thompson knew that the well referred to in Hintzen's
water application was, by the terms of said application,
to be drilled upon the lands covered by Hintzen's contract with McGarry and that water develO'ped therefrom
was to be used for the irrigati.on of said land." That
such finding is without support in the evidence and is
contrary t~ the preponderance thereof. (Complaint page
4, R. 35)
3. The trial court erred in making that ·part of finding numbered 13 wherein it is found that: ''Said Thompson knew or should have known that an application to
appropriate four second feet of water would not be
granted for the irrigation of twenty acres of ground."
That said finding is without any support in the evidence.
(Complaint page 4, R. 35)
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4. The trial court erred in making that part of finding nun1bered 13 wherein it is found that: ''Said Thompson could easily have made inquiry from McGarry concerning the status of the Hintzen application and could
have learned easily that such ap,plieation had been previously assigned by Hintzen to McGarry'' for the reason
that such finding is immaterial. (Complaint pages 4-5,
R. 35-36)
5. The trial court erred in making its s-o-called finding of fact number 14 and the whole thereof for the
reason that the same is without support in the evidence,
that the same is contrary to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. (Complaint page 5, R. 36)
6. The trial court erred in making its conclusion of
law numbered 1 and the whole thereof. Th~t such conclusion of law is without support in the findings of fact
and is without support in the evidence. (R. 36)
7. The trial eourt erred in making its conclusion of
law numbered 2 in that such conclusion of law is without support in lhe findings of fact and is without support
in the evidence. ( R. 36)
8. The trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law numbered 3 in that such conclusion of law is not
supported by either the findings of fact or the evidence.
(R. 36)
9. The trial court erred in making its conclusion of
law numbered 4 in that such conclusion of law is without
support in the evidence and is contrary to the law applicable to the facts as shown by the evidence. (R. 36)
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10. The trial court erred in making its conclusion of
law numbered 5 in that such conclusion of law is not supported by the findings of fact and is contrary to the law
applicable to the .facts as shown by the evidence. (R. 36)
11. The trial court erred in making its conclusion of
law numbered 6 in that such conclusion of law is without
support in the findings of fact and is contrary to the law
applicable to the facts shown by the evidence. (R. 36. )
12. The tr.ial court erred in making its conclusion
of law numbered 7 in that such conclusion of law is without support in the findings of fact and is contrary to the
law a'pplicable to the facts disclosed by the evidence. (R.
37)

13. The trial court erred in making paragraph 1
of its decree in that said portion of the decree is without
support either· in the evidence or the findings of fact.
(R. 38)
14. The trial court erred in making its paragraph
2 of its decree in that said portion of its decree is without support in either the evidence or the findings of fact,
and is contrary to law. (R. 39)
15. The trial court erred in making paragraph 3
of its decree in that such paragraph is without support in
either the evidence or the findings of fact and is contrary
to law. (R. 39)
16. The trial court erred in making paragraph 4 of
its decree in that said part of the decree is without supSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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port in either the evidence or the findings of fact. (R.
39)

17. The trial court erred in failing to affirm the
order made by the State Engineer of Utah wherein and
whereby the State Engineer approved the exchange application of the appellant Jerold E. Thompson.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
While the appellant Thompson has made 17 assignments of error the questions ·presented for review may
be reduced to three, namely :
o
1. l\Iay one who has merely made and filed in the
office of the State Engineer an application assign such
application to another and thereby transfer to such assignee a vested interest in such ap'plication prior to the
approval of such application by the State Eng~ineer~
2. Does the evidence in this ease support the finding and conclusion of the trial court to the effect that the
appellant Jerold E. Thompson was not a bona fide purchaser for value of the application to ap~p~ropriate water
which was filed by Martin C. Hintzen.
3. l\Iay an assignee of an ap!plication to appropriate
water defeat the right of a subsequent assignee of such
application where the first assignee fails and neglects
to place his assignment of record in the office of the
State Engineer prior to the time the subsequent assignee
has secured his assignment and placed the same of record
in such office, especially where the first assignee has
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partici·pated in the plan to have the application placed
in the name of the applicant~
We shall discuss the first two questions above suggested and adopt the discussion made by the State Engineer touching the third question. If this court should
conclude that the purported assignment of the application to appropriate water by Hintzen to McGarry is and
was a nullity it will probably not be necessary to consider the other two suggested questions.
I

THE PURPOR.TED ASSIGNMENT OF THE HINTZEN APPLICATIO·N TO APPROPRIATE WATER
TO McGARRY WAS AND IS A NULLITY.
While we have been unable to find an adjudicated
case dealing with the question of whether or not an unapproved application to appropriate water may be assigned
it is a well established rule of common law that the mere
possibility or probability that a right may come into
existence at some future time is not assignable. The law
in such particular is thus expressed in 4 Am. Jur. Sec.
4, page 232:
''A mere possibility or expectancy not coupled
with an interest cannot, at common law, be made
the subject of a valid assignment or transfer. It is
the general rule of law, in the absence of any
statutory modification, that in order that a right
or interest can be assigned, it must have at the
time of the assignment either an actual or a poSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tential existence. A distinction is made between
what 'vas termed a 1nere possibility and a "possibility coupled 'vith an interest'.''
Numerous cases will be found collected in a foot note
to the text which under various circumstances support the
general rule. We shall not burden the court with an
analysis of those cases because none of them are directly
in point, but the principles of law therein announced
lend son1e support to the view that the unapproved application of Hintzen was not assignable because he had
no vested interest to assign. 1foreover to permit such an
assignment would offend against the provision of our
statutory law relating to the appropriation of water.
"It shall be the duty of the state engineer,
upon the pa)'Illent of the approval fee, to approve
an application if: (1) There is unappropriated
water in the proposed source; (2) The proposed
use will not impair existing rights, or interfere
with the more beneficial use of the water; (3) The
proposed plan is physically and economically
feasible unless the application is filed by the
United States bureau of reclamation and, would
not prove detrimental to the public welfare; and
( 4) The applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works and the application was
filed in good faith and not for the purposes of
speculation or 1nonopoly; rprovidtetd, that where
the state engineer, because of information in his
possession obtained either by his own investigation or otherwise, has reason to believe .that an
application to appropriate water will interfere
with its more beneficial, use for irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock watering, power or minSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing development or manufacturing, or will prove
detrimental to the public welfare, it shall he his
duty to withhold his approval or rejection of the
application until he shall have investigated the
matter. The cost of such inquiry shall be paid by
the person making the application, as provided by
Section 100-2-14, if such application is approved.
If an application does not meet the requirements
of this section, it shall be rejected." U.C.A. 1943,
100-3-8.
It will be observed from the provisions of the statute
just quoted that before an a~pplication to appropriate
water may properly he approved by the State Engineer
it becomes his duty to make the investigation provided for
in the portion of the section of the statute just quoted.
If the statute has not been complied with the application
may not be approved.
In the absence of a showing to the contrary it must
be assumed that the State Engineer did his duty in such
part1cula.r and refused to approve the application unless
and until it was amended so that the water applied for
might be put to a beneficial use as hy statute provided.
A few illustrations might be suggested to illustrate what
we mean. If the State Engineer did what the statute required he might well have determined that there was no
una;ppropriated water for use on the 100 acres covered
by the contract between McGarry and Hintzen. It is a
matter of common knowledge that even though there
may be underground water available from a common
source to irrigate say 1000 acres of land if an attempt
is made to pump all of the available water from, at or
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near one point it may 'Yell be that the water from distant points could not be made available. In this· connection it will be observed that the proposed place of use
provided for in Hint.zen's filing was that the South East
Quarter of Section 8, Township 35 South, Range 16 West,
while the place "~here Thompson. proposes to use the
water is the South West Quarter of Section 14, Township 35, South, Range 17 West. (Trs. Plaintiff's Exhibit "B") Thus the two tracts are separated by a very
substantial distance. It may be that the State Engineer
in the performance of his duty concluded that there was
no unappropriated "\Vater available on the Hintzen's
property but there was unappropria;ted water available
on the property purchased by lola M. Thompson, the
wife of appellant Jerold E. Thompson. If that were so it
was the duty of the State Engineer to withhold ap!p~roval
of the application until such time as the application was
amended to change the point of diversion to a place
where water was available.
Again it may be that the land where it was first proposed the water should be used was unfit f_or use as irrigated farm lands because it consist:ed of sand dunes or
gravel or rocks or other reasons. If that were so the State
Engineer would be derelict in his duty if he approved an
application to appropriate water on such land. Again it
may be that the State Engineer concluded that the app~licant did not have the financial ability to complete the
proposed works; or that the application was not filed in
good faith or that it was filed for purposes of speculation in which case the application should not be approved
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until these objections had been removed. That the appellant Thompson was acting in good faith cannot be op.en
to question because he expended nearly $2,000.00 to construct a well within the ·six months period allowed by the
State Engineer to begin construction. The State Engineer
may well have concluded from an investigation and from
other evidence available to him that respondent McGarry
was not acting in good faith when he secured the assignment of. the Htntzen application or that he secured the
3:ssignrnent for purely speculative purposes. He was engaged in buying and selling real estate.
So far as app,ears neither Hintzen nor McGarry ever
did anything towards drilling a well on the 100 acres of
land described in the 1\tfcGarry-Hintzen contract. For
some reason known only to Mr. McGarry he kept 'the
alleged assignment of the Hintzen application in his possession without filing the same with the State Engineer.
The State Engineer could not intelligently perform the
duties ·imposed upon him by sub-division 4 of U.C.A.
1943, 100.::3-8 withou't being advised as to the owner of
the .application at or p'rior to the time that he approved
or rejected such application.
In connection with the provisions of U.C.A. 1943,
100-3-8 above mentioned it may he well to consider that
part of U.C.A. 1943, 100-3-18 wherein it is provided that:
''Prior to issuance-of certificate of a ppropriation, rights claimed under applications for the app-ropriation of water may be transferred or assigned by instruments in writing. Such instruSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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·ments, when acknowledged or proved and certified in the n1anner provided by law for the acknowledgment or proving of conveyances of real
estate, may be filed in the office of the state engineer and shall from tin1e of filing of same in
said office impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof. Notices of claims to underground
water filed pursuant to the provisions of section
100-5-12 may be transferred or assigned by instruments in writing in the manner herein provided.''
While the statute last quoted does not expressly refer
to an approved application for the appropriation of
water it does speak of rights claimed under such an application. The language rights claimed must necessarily
apply only to an approved app,lic.ation because until the
application is approved there can be no rights. The only
possible right that an applicant to appropriate water
has prior to its approval is the right to have the State
Engineer pass upon the application by either approving or rejecting the same. Whether the same shall be
approved or rejected depends upon the status of the
applicant or his assignee at the time of the approval;
that is to say, whether the holder of the application is
entitled to an approval pursuant to the Jl'rovision of
U.C.A. 1943, 100-3-8, heretofore quoted. When Mr. Hintzen, by the assignment of his application to Mr. Thompson, informed the State Engineer that he had parted with
any right he may have in the application the State Engineer was called upon to act upon the application as
the same then existed. That is what the State Engineer
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did when he' approved defendant's Exhibit "C" designated as the ''Change Application Approved.''
There is nothing in the pleadings or in the evidence,
or in the findings of fact or conclusion of law which
show or tend to show that Mr. McGarry had or could
have met the requirements of U.C.A. 1943, 100-3-8 to
entitle him to have the original application of Mr~ ~int
zen a'pproved and thereby breath life into his so-called
assignment of the Hintzen application.
The entire case presented by the respondent is bottomed on the false assumption that the mere filing of
an application to appropriate water gives the applicant
a vested right in some water. If that be so our statutory
laws, and particularly Section 100-3-8, is rendered meaningless. If the mere filing of an application gives the
applicant a right to the public waters of this state then
indeed would it be an easy matter to secure a monopoly
of the public waters of this state contrary to the provisions of U.C.A. 1943, 100-3-8.
We do not wish to be understood as contending that
the State Engineer may arbitrarily or capriciously refuse to ap1prove an application to appropriate waters
but we do contend that the assignment of an unapproved
application does not give the assignee a vested interest
in such unapproved application and that before the assignee of an una'P:proved application to appropTiate
water has any standing in court he must show that he
meets the requirements of section 100-3-8.
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· Moreover, before a court is authorized to reverse
the State Engineer in refusing to recognize as valid an
assignment of an unapproved application to appropriate
the water such assignee must show at least that he meets
the requirements of U.C.A. 100-3-8. That in the absence
of such a sho,ving the action of the State Engineer is not
vulnerable to attack by such purported assignee. In the
absence of ·proof to the contrary the courts will assume
that the State Engineer has performed the· duties imposed upon him by law.
II
JEROLD E. THOMPSON WAS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR ':ALUE OF THE HINTZEN APPLICATION TO APPROPRIATE WATER.
If we are right in what has heretofore been said
there would seem to be no occasion to be concerned about
the other two questions heretofore suggested in this brief.
If the respondent acquired no vested interest cognizable
in a court of law by reason of the purported assignment
of the Hintzen application to app:ropria:te water then
and in such case the respondent had no grounds to complain of the order of the State Engineer granting the
application of appellant Thompson to change the place
of the diversion and use of the Hintzen application. On
the other hand if Thompson is not entitled to prevail on
such ground then it becomes necessary to consider the
other prop:ositions.
There can be no doubt that appellant Thompson perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
formed labor for Hintzen in clearing brush from 80 acres
of the land owned by Hintzen and that the value of such
labor wa.s $10.00 per acre or a total of $800 . 00. The evi..
dence so shows and there is no evidence to the contrary.
There is no evidence which shows or tends to show
that the ·,appellant Thompson knew that Hintzen had assigned the application to Mr. McGarry. The evidence is
that Mr. Hintzen assured Mr. Thompson that he had
not assigned the application to Mr. McGarry and that
he, Thompson, did not know of any such claim being
made until he, in December 1946, received notice of the
£~act that Mr. McGary had filed a protest to the granting of Thompson's application to change the place of
diversion and use of the Hintzen application to the lands
'vhich had been purchased by Mrs. Thompson, the wife
of appellant Thompson. Apparently the basis for the
trial court's finding that Thompson was not a bona fide
purchaser was because Thompson knew that ~{cGarry
had sold the 100 acres of land for the irrigation of which
Hintzen had made an application with the State Engineer
to approp-riate water and that Hintzen had returned a
part of such land back to McGarry.
1

It will be noted from the statement of the case heretofore set qut in this brief that it was MeGarry who participated in and approved the plan for Mr. Hintzen to
make the application in his oWn. name, notwithstanding
the land stood in the name of Mr. McGarry.
It will also be recalled that Thompson was not
familiar with the procedure necessary to acquire the
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right to the use of underground 'vater and that before
making the deal with Hintzen he 'yent to the office of
the State Engineer to ascertain. ho"\v and from who1n he
could secure a W'"ater right and that Thompson was, at
the office of the State Engineer, given the names of a
number of persons 'vho, according to the records of the
State Engineer, had filed applications to appropriate
water, among them being 1\fr. Hintzen. That with this
information in mind Thompson took up negotiations with
Hintzen for the purchase of the Hintzen application with
the result that he acquired from Hintzen an assignment
of his application.
In its finding numbered 13 the trial court seems to
attach considerable im·portance to the fact that the Hintzen application was to appropriate four c.f.s. We are at
a loss to understand the significance of such finding. If
a stream of four cubic feet per second is the most economical stream to be used in the irrigation of lands in
the area here involved such a stream would be the proper
size of. a stream to use for the irrigation of 40 acres or
20 acres of land as well as for the irrigation of 160 acres
of land. We are not familiar with the practice of the State
Engineer in the matter of allowing application for a
water right in the vicinity of the lands here involved but
we do venture the statement that if the State Engineer
allows a filing of 4 c.f.s. for 160 acres of land and proportionately reduces the filings for smaller acreage so
that only 0 of a second foot of water may be used for the
irrigation of 20 acres of land it is high time that the State
Engineer revised his rulings in such particular.

.
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It is doubtful if lj2 of a second foot of water would be
of any substantial value in irrigating 20 acres of land
or any other quantity except possibly a garden. We know
of no valid reason why a stream of 4 c.f.s. may not be allowed for the irrigation of 20 acres of land as well as
160. Of course we can well appreciate that the person with
160 acres of land would have the use of 4 c.f.s. for a
period of eight times longer than the ·person with 20
acres of land. To conclude that ~fr. Thompson is chargeable with notice that Mr. Hintzen had parted with his
claim to the filing which stood in his name in the office
of the State Engineer because of the stre~am applied for
by Hintzen would be to charge Thompson with knowledge of something which few, if any, farmers who irrigate their lands would know or ever suspect.
In paragraph 2 of the court's findings of fact there
is set out that ~part of the contract between Hintzen and
McGarry, wherein it is provided that in the event the
purchaser M·. C. Hintzen made application to appropriate
water from wells to he drilled on the said· premises and
thereafter defaulted in the performance of his contract
the seller should i1nmediately become the assignee of said
application and in the event a certificate of appropriation
had issued to the buyer the water right represented thereby should he considered as appurtenant to the said
premises.
We are at a loss to see wherein such provision aids
the respondent. It is not claimed and there is no evidence
which shows or tends to show that appellant knew that
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there \Yere any such provisions in the Hintzen-McGarry
contract. Hintzen did not default in his contract and no
certificate of appropriation ever issued. Horeover, water
may not be made appurtenant to land, especially as to
third parties by an unrecorded contract. This court is
committed to the doctrine that an application to ap,propriate water is not appurtenant to land. Duchle·sne
County, et al, vs. Hu1nphr.eys, et ,az., 106 Utah 332; 148
Pac. ( 2d) 338.
It does not appear in the case just cited whether or
not the application to ap:propriate water had been approved. It is there also held that ''no vested water rights
were ever acquired and therefore could not have passed
to the county as appurtenant to land which it obtained by
i~s tax sale.'' In this case no application was ever approved ~permitting the appropriation of water to the
land described in the Hintzen-McGarry contract. Thus
no right to the use of water on such land was ever initiated. There was nothing, except the mere filing of a
paper in the office of the State Engineer, that could hecome appurtenant to the land.
The above mentioned provision of the Hintzen-McGarry contract contemplates that an attempt would be
made to secure water to irrigate the land described in
such contract. That respondent McGarry sought to have
Hintzen make an ap:plication in his own name to appropriate water for the land in question is readily conceded.
By such means the respondent held out to the world that
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spondent is chargeable with knowledge of the various
provisions of the law which requires that the office of the
State Engineer is required to keep public records of the
owners of water rights within the state of Utah. Respond..,
ent must also have known that one who seeks to ascertain
who are holders of applications to appropriate the public waters of this state would of necessity seek such inforlnation in the office of the State Engineer. That is the
only public office in the State of Utah where such information may be had. Respondent is not only chargeable with such knowledge because it is the law of this
sta t'e but the fact, as he testified at the trial, of his being
in the real estate business in and about Cedar City and
Iron County for 14 years, makes it obvious that the respondent was in fact familiar with the law in such particular. Notwithstanding the respondent is chargeable
with and had actual knowledge of the method and manner
of filing on the public waters of this state the respondent
caused and permitted the only public records of the
State of Utah to proclaim to every one that Hintzen was
the owner and holder of the application to appropriate
water involved in this controversy. That state of facts
continued until after Tho1npson had performed labor of
the value of $800.00 for Hintzen in clearing land in consideration of Hintzen's assigning to Thompson the application to appropriate water. Indeed that state of facts
continued to exist until after Thompson made his application to change the point of diversion of the water
applied for in Hintzen's application.
It is the position of Thompson that such· a state
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facts precludes ~[~Garry from now asserting that his
assignment is superior to that of Thompson.
The eases dealing "~ith estopple in its various phases
and kindred rules of la'v are exceedingly nuinerous and
it has frequently been said that each case must depend
upon its o'Yn facts. There are, however, well defined
principles of law that serve as a guide to a proper conelusion in any particular case, among them being:
"A party may be estopped to insist upon a
claim, asse-rt an objection or take a position which
is inconsistent with an admission which he has
previously made and in reliance upon which the
other party has c;hanged his position." 19 Am.
Jur. Sec. 63, page 681.
''The doctrine of estoppel by negligence is an
application of the general principle of equity
which is further discussed under this title, that
when oile of two innocent persons-that is, persons eaeh guiltless of an intentional moral wrong,
must suffer a loss it must be borne by that one of
them who, by his conduct, has rendered the injury possible." 19 Am. Jur .., Sec. 67, page 695.
Our Supreme Court referred to and applied this
doctrine in the case of Harrison vs. Auto Security Co.,
et al, 257 Pac. 677, 679:
''An estoppel will arise against the real owner
however where he clothes the person assuming
to dispose of the property with the apparent title
to it or with apparent authority to dispose of it
when the person setting up the estopp:el acts and
parts with value or extends credit on the faith
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of such apparent ownership or authority." 19 Arn.
Jur., Sec. 68, pages 696 and 697.
''When the record title . to real property
stands in the name of one man another, who is
the real owner, may be estopped from setting up
his title or interest." 19 Am. Jur. Sec. 112, pages
764, 765.
Cases will be found cited in foot notes to the foregoing texts in support thereof. An instructive annotation will be found in 50 A.L.R. 730, 731.
)

The respondent in this case took part in having the
ap•plication to appropriate water here in question pl'aced
in the name of another, thereby holding out to the "\vorld
that such other was the owner of the application notwithstanding the legal title to the land where the water was
to be appropriated stood in the name of respondent. He
for reasons knoWn only to him failed to record the purported assignment from Hintzen. Under such a state of
facts res·p:Ondent may not now successfully claim his
assignment superior to that of Thompson.
It may be argued that appellant, not having pleaded
estoppel, may not rely upon such doctrine. There is no
magic in the use of the word '' es'toppel'' in a pleading.
If the facts pleaded constitute an estoppel that is sufficient. That is especially so in a suit to quiet title. In
effect this is such a suit. Haskins vs. Tulley, 29 N.M.
173; 270 Pac. 1007. Campbell vs. S. and Tr. Co., 63 Utah
366; 226 P. 190; Gibson vs. M:cCurren, 37 Utah
158; 106 Pac. 669. If Thompson may not rely upon the
princi·ples of estoppel because not pleaded by the same
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token respondent may not rely upon his claim of notice
because not pleaded.
It seems to have been the view of the trial court that
Tho1npson should haYe made further inquiry as to
\Vhether or not }!cGarry claimed any interest in the application. He, Thompson, did make inquiry at the office of
the State Engineer \vhere Hintzen was the record owner
of the "\Vater right application in question and further
learned that Hintzen was willing to assign or transfer
the same to Thompson upon his clearing the lands
claimed by Hintzen. In light of the fact that respondent
had been instrumental in having the water right application placed and permitted to stand in the name of Hintzen the situation \vas similar to· a case where one states
that he is not the owner of land and has no interest therein and later without revoking such statement comes into
court and the~e seeks to escape the consequence of his
statement by saying that he had changed his mind before
the injured ·-p~erson acted upon such statement; that before one may safely rely upon such statement he must
seek out the person making the statement to ascertain if
he had changed his mind. Possibly ·such procedure would
incense the person making the statement and cause him
to retort that if and when he changed his mind he would
let that fact be known by placing his assignment of record in the prop,er office.
If Thompson had gone and made inquiry at the office of the county recorder of Iron County or had secured
an abstract of the prop:erty standing in the name of the
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respondent he would have found nothing to enlighten
him. He would doubtless have learned that respondent
owned or claimed to own the land upon which Hintzen
held an application to appropriate water and nothing
n1ore. That was the situation when Hintzen made the
application by and with the consent, approval and instigation of the respondent.

A situa.tion not unlike the one here presented was
involved in the case of Wooley vs. Dowse, 86 Utah 221;
41 Pac. (2d) 709. It is there held that ·purchasers of water
stock may rely on the stock record unless they have actual
knowledge that stock has been mortgaged, pledged or
disposed of or unless there is some other circumstance
\vhich would charge them with notice other than mere
lmowledge that .some previous owner declared water to
be appurtenant.
"That one who buys water stock actually
knew that former certificate stated that water represented by certificate bel{)nged to certain tract of
land when he knew that no water was being used
on such land would not charge him with duty of
searching chain of title to land to see whether instruments on county recorder's record dealt with
such water."
The foregoing quotation is from the sylla·bus of the
case above cited and reflects the opinion of the court.
The facts in the foregoing case were much weaker,
as we read the opinion, in support of the conclusion that
the purchaser of the water stock was a bona fide purchaser, than are the facts in this case in favor of a holdSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing that defendant Thon1pson was a bona fide purchaser
of the application to appropriate water which forms
the subject matter of this controversy.
It should he noted that the reason the application
here involved is of great value to Tho1npson is because
the Governor of Utah has issued a public proclam~tion
pursuant to Sec. 100-8-1, U.C.A. 1943, declaring that no
more water may be acp·propriated in the area where Hintzen filed his application to appropriate water.
III
THE RE·SPONDENT McGARRY \VAS REQUIRED
TO FILE HIS ASSIG·NMEN·T WITH THE STATE
ENGINEER IN ORDER TO HAVE PRIORITY OVER
THE RECORDED ASSIGNMENT TO· THOMPSON.
Most of the points of law involved in the instant
case have no general importance and the state engineer
has no interest in the result reached by the court in deciding them. There is one proposition, however, which
the state engineer considers of utmost importance to the
administration of his office. For that reason an ap:peal
was taken. Let it be said at the outset that the state engineer is not interested in which of these two individuals
ultimately succeeds in getting this water. The state engineer does not as a policy come to the aid of one water
claimant as against another in litigation of this type.
It is for this reason that he did not participate in the
submission of the evidence in the trial court. Where, however, an important principle of law is involved which
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will affect the administration of his office the state engineer deems it advisable to join in the appeal and to
submit his views for the consideration of the court.
The principle point with which the state engineer
is concerned is the holding that Sec. 100-3-18 does not require the recordation of an assignment of a water right.
Plaintiff asserts that his failure to record is of no consequence whatever because the statute itself does not
expressly provide any penalty for failure to record or
file with the state engineer. It is not often that cases
directly in point from the same jurisdiction are available and reasoning must often he done by analogy. Here,
however, there is a Utah Supreme Court opinion ~hich
also was appealed to and affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court which is directly in point. We are at loss
to explain why the trial court should attempt to overrule
it. Before analyzing this Utah case we desire to call
specific attention to the language of Sec. 100-3-18, U.C.A.
19'43, and to the general statutory pattern in Utah for
the recordation of water rights.
Sec. 100-3-18, in part provides :
''Prior to issuance of certificate of appropriation, rights claimed under applications for
the appropriation of water may he transferred or
assigned by instruments in writing. Such instruments, when acknowledged or proved and certified
in the manner provided by law for the acknowledgment or p:roving of conveyance of real estate, may
be filed and recorded in the office of the state
engineer, and shall from the time of filing the
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sa1ne be recorded in said off'ic,e inlpnTt notice t1o
all persons of the contents therreof." (Em~phasis
added)
This is only one of several Utah statutes relating to
the recordation of \Yater rights. Sec. 100-1-10 and 1001-11 pro,ide for the recordation of perfected rights.
Similar provisions have 'been in the law since 1905, with
various amendments since that time. In 1945 Sec. 1001-10 was amended. See Chapter 134, Laws of Utah 1945.
. .-\s amended this section requires the county recorder to
transfer to the state engineer copies of all transfers of
water rights recorded under the ~pTovisions of 100-1-10
with the county recorder.
Sec. 100-5-12, U.C.A. 1943, (enacted in 1935) requires
registration of all claims to underground water. These
are to be recorded with the state engineer. Thus diligence
rights to underground water are by this last cited See.
(100-5-12) to be recorded; all transfers of perfected
water rights are to be recorded with the county recorder,
and by the provisions of 100-1-10, as amended in 1945,
certified copies must be filed with the state engineer.
These cover all diligence rights to underground water
and all perfect,ed rights to any kind of water. Section
100-3-18 completes the statutory pattern by providing
for the recordation of transfer& of unperfected water
rights.
In Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition,
by Horack, published in 1943, certain rules of construction are set forth for interpreting recording statutes.
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This material is contained at Section 7003, •page 362, Vol.
3. It is there stated:
''Recording statutes are enacted for the protection of the public, so that subs·equent good faith
creditors will be put on notice of prior transactions which may affect their title or security
interest, and these statutes are usually given a
liberal interpr~tation to accomplish this purpose
* * *. The recording statutes are generally construed so that the subsequent purchaser in good
faith is protected against prior purchasers although the subsequent purchaser has not recordedhis transaction. Likewise, the technical formalities
in recording are so1ne times overlooked to accomplish an equitable operation of the statute."
This same concept is expressed in 53 Corpus Juris,
page 606, which provides as follows :
''Although it has been held that recording
acts can~ot he extended by implication, but must
be construed literally in absence of ambiguity
or language requiring judicial interp~retation, recording statutes are remedial, and should be liberally construed so as to attain the object intended
by them. The design of recording laws is to prevent fraud in transactions by securing certainty
and publicity in such dealing; their whole object is
to permit and require the public to act with the
presumption that recorded instruments exist and
are genuine; and they should not be construed to
produce fraud, but sa as ~to p·revent it.''
To the same effect see Lewis v. State, 32 Ariz. 182,
256 P. 1048; Clark v. Green, 73 Minn., 467, 76 N.W. 263;
Akerberg v. McCraney, 141 Minn . , 2:30 169 N.W. 802.
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THE UTAH ·CASES
Sec. 100-3-18, as quoted above, was enacted in 1919
and has re1nained substantially unchanged. In approaching the lTtah case 'vhich "\Ye think is squarely in point,
the court should keep in mind that Sec. 100-3-18, expressly ·provides that an assignment filed with the state engineer \vill constitute notice to all persons of its contents. If it were not the intent of the Legislature to require recordation for the protection of good faith purchasers what possible use would be the provision that
such recordation shall impart constructive notice~ This
thought played an important role in the Utah case discussed immediately below.
The case which "\Ye think is directly in point is Wells,
Fargo & C.a. v. Smith, 2 Utah 39. The case was ap,pealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court and was there aftirmed. See
N eslin v. Wells, 104 U. S. 428.
This Utah case involved the construction of early
territorial statutes which provided for the recordation of
transfers of land. Until 1874 the territorial statutes contained no provision whatever prescribing the conseqt~;ences of failure to record. In this regard the statute
under construction by the Utah Supreme Court and by
the U. S. Supreme Court is a direct parallel to See:.
100-3-18. Both statutes are silent as to the consequences
of a failure to record. The cases are also alike in this :
The statute under construction in the Wells, Fargo case
did not use mandatory language to require the transferee to record the transfer. The statute merely perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

mitted him to file and provideed that in event he did file
the recorded instrument could be introduced in
Court as evidence of the transaction. ·se·c. 100-3-18 is
much stronger and could well be construed as making
recording mandatory. Let us however assume, for the
purpose of argument, that it is only directory because
it provides that such a transfer of an application "may"
be filed. The use of the word "may" might lead the
court to construe the statute as being permissive rather
than mandatory. Concede this to be true and even then
the case is a direct parallel to the Wells, Fargo case, as
both the Utah court and the U. S. Supreme Court held
that the statute under construction for recording of land
transactions was merely permissive rather than mandatory.
We then have two direct parallels in this case and
the Wells, Fargo case. (1) neither statute being construed contained any proviso enumerating the consequences of failure to rec?rd and, ( 2) neither statute required a filing; the language used indicating that £ping
was merely permissive. ·
The statute in question, Sec. 100-3-18, is stronger
for us than wa.s the statute in the Wells, Fargo case, in
that it ex·pressly provides that an instrument recorded
pursuant to the statute will impart constructive notice
to the world. The statute in the Wells, Fargo case left
such e;onclusion to inference.
The facts of the Wells, Fargo case were as follows:
one Smith was indebted to Wells, Fargo in the sum of
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$17,000, represented by a promissory note dated July
15, 1S73. Smith induced one John W. Keer to indemnify
the payee on said note, and to secure Kerr, Smith gave
hin1 a mortgage dated September 27, 1873, and Kerr assigned the n1ortgage to Wells, Fargo as collateral security for the note of Sn1ith held by them. Neither Kerr nor
,,~ells, Fargo had any actual notice of any prior liens on
the mortgaged land. They recorded their mortgage on
September 29, 1873. Smith was in possession of the mortgaged premises and he continued in possession. On November 27, 1872, Smith had delivered to one N eslin a
prior note for $7,000 and a prior mortgage on the same
property described in the later mortgage to Kerr. Neslin did not record his mortgage until after the mortgage
to Kerr had been recorded. We thus had a situation exactly like that presented in the instant case. N eslin held
the first mortgage but failed to record it. Thereafte,r
Kerr obtained ·a mortg,age ·On the s1arme p·remises and f"!ecorded it. The Supreme Court said that the single question in the case was "whether, under the laws of Utah in
force at the time of the transaction a junior mortgage,
taken without notice of a prior mortgage, a~tual or constructive, and first recorded, is to be preferred in its
lien to a mortgage prior in execution but subsequently
recorded.'' The statutes which were then in effect are
analyzed by the United States Su~p-reme Court decision in
some detail so that I will not requote them here. Suffice it to say that the statutes in question were territorial
statutes enacted in 1855. The statute p'ermitte'd recordation of a mortgage but did not require it. It pTovided no
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consequence for failure to record. Both the Utah Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court held that
the failure to record under such a statute took from N eslin any advantage he gained from the fact that his mortgage was executed a year earlier than the mortgage of
Kerr. The United States Supreme Court said:
''The Legislation on the subject prior to 1874,
it will be observed, did not require that the mortgage should be recorded in order to be valid, anu
did not in terms declare what should be the legal
effect of recording or omitting to record it.
"That Legislation cannot, however, be ass tuned to be without significance, and its precise meaning must be determined, not only by
what it expresses but by what it necessarily inlp~lies.

''There can be no reasonable doubt, we think,
that the records which the county recorder is
bound to keep, which private persons are authorized to employ for recording their instruments
and evidences of title, and which the public have a
right to inspect, have all the qualities that attach
to public records. ·
****
"It is a mere corollary from this datum that
these records are, by construction of law, notice
. to all persons of what they contain. (In Sec. 1003-18, this is expressly provided). Their contents
are matters of public knowledge, because the law
requires them to be kept, authorizes them to be
used, and secures to all p·ersons access to them, in
order that the knowledge of them may be public,
and, therefore, imputes to all interested in it that
knowledge the opportuni:ty to acquire which it has
provided. The law assumes the fulfilment and not
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the defeat of its o'vn ends. It will not per1nit its
policy to be gainsaid, not even by a plea of per. .
sonal ignorance of its existence or extent. * * * *
The provisions of the law in reference to these
records either haYe no purpose at all,-,vhich we
haYe no right to assume,-or their purpose was,
that the public might have kno,vledge of the titles
to real estate of 'vhieh they are the registers. It
'vould utterly defeat that purpose not to presume
'Yith conclusive force that the notice which it was
their office to communicate had reached the party
interested to receive it; for, if every man was at
liberty to say he had failed to acquire the knowledge it was important for him to have, because he
had not taken the trouble to search the record
which the la"'" had provided for the expres~ purpose of giving it to him, then the ignorance which
it was the public interest and policy to pr,event
would become universal, and the law would fail
because it refused to make itself respected.''
It must be emphasized that the reasoning of the
Supreme Court to reach the result of constructive notice
is not really needed here because Sec. 100-3-18 exp-ressly
provides that the instrument recorded pursuant to the
section will impart notice of its contents.
The single question left is whether or not the failure
expressly to provide a consequence for failure to record
makes the failure to record of no consequence. As noted
by the Supreme Court there simply could be no purpose
in this statute in imparting constructive notice to all persons unless all persons are to have the right to rely on
the public record. It would be the rankest injustice to
hold that this statute imparts notice to the world and is
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binding on all if recorded and yet to hold as did the trial
court that the public could not rely on the record made.
Why bind the public to take notice of the record if, after
having taken notice of it, they cannot rely on it~ Of what
possible good would such a statute be except as a trap
for the public~ If they check the pu·blic record and find
title to be of record in the name of John Doe they should
with perfect safety be allowed to take from John Doe
and to pay him value therefor. Such was the conclusion
reached both by Utah Supreme Court and the United
States· Su·preme Court, for the United States Supreme
Court went on to say:
"The statutes under consideration, it is true,
do not in e:np,re.ss terms make it obligatory upon
one ·t,aking a conveyanc,e of or incumbrance upon
re,al es:t1at.e to record it. The recording is not made
essential to its validity as between the parties;
no.r i:s it declared that the f~ailure t;o neoor~d shall
postp·one its ope'rlation iJn "favor of a subsequent
bona fide purchaser for valrue wi.thout wotice. And
yet the implication is very st'rong that the latter
efferJt; must be in~ended by it. Otherwise what valuable and sufficient purpose is there in construing
the record to be constructive notice of its contents,
except to protect such a purchaser~ If, without
recording, the conveyance is not only valid between the parties, but good also as against the
vvorks, with or without notice, of what public
value or use is the provision for keeping such
a record and declaring it to be public, open to the
examination of all pers'ons ~ On that supposition,
its only purpose would he in the p:rivate interest of
proprietor to furnish a convenient and cheap: mode
of supplying proof, by certified copies, in case of
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the loss of destruction of title-pap.ers. But even
that purpose is not exiJressly declared. It is only
an inference based on the nature of the record as
public, and the objects 'vhich, under the system of
registration adopted in this country, in colonial
times, and 'vhich has since prevailed universally
in all the States, have been sought to he attained
by it. The chief of these is to secure that publicity
in respect of the transfer of titles which, in the
earlier history of the common law, was effected by
livery of seisin, and later, by the substituted ·enrolment of conveyances by way of bargain and
sale; and 'Yhich had in view, as its principal purpose, the protection of innocent purchasers from
frauds which might be practiced by means of
secret conveyances.
''To hold otherwise would be to declare that
land should cease generally to be the subject of
sale; for no amount of diligence on the part of a
p~urchaser would insure .his title. He would, of
course, demand of the vendor a:ri inspection of his
title-deeds. From them he would learn the chain
of title."
The United States Supreme Court discussed this·
concept for about eight pages. It clearly holds that the
only purpose that there could possibly be for making
public records constructive notice of their contents is
to protect innocent purchasers dealing with the record
title holder. The Utah Supreme Court held exactly the
same thing. There was a dissenting o;pinion based upon
the doctrines argued by the plaintiff in this case. Those
contentions were expressly over-ruled and the position
taken by the state engineer in this case was expressly
affirmed.
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There has been no need for a further decision by
the Utah ,Court construing our statutes regarding recordation of land transfers, for in 1874 the statute under
consideration in the Wells, Fargo case was amended exp.ressly to provide that the failure to record would make
a conveyance void against the subsequent purchaser
without notice. I have Sheppardized the Utah case and
state that it has not been over-ruled. I have also checked
the United States Supreme Court case in Sheppard's
Citator and find that it has been cited by some state
courts with approval and that it has never been overruled.

WHY IS THIS O,F INTEREST TO THE STArE
ENGINEER
The state engineer is alarmed over the holding that
some third party
. may hold title to an unapproved
. application without ever recording that assignment with
the state engineer. By Sec. 100-3-8 the Legislature has
imposed certain duties upon the state engineer. Those
duties cannot be faithfully discharged unless the state
engineer knows who the owner of the water application
is. For example the state engineer has to determine
whether or not it will be detrimental to the public welfare to approve an application. Certainly a determination of this question will often require knowledge concerning the owner of the application. If the owner were
a speculator who never intended to farm the land himself or to drill a well the ap'Plication might well be denied
in favor of a pending application filed by a farmer who
\
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certainly would develop and beneficially use the water.
There is no possible way that the state engineer can ascertain \Yhether or not the approval of the application
1night 'prove detrimental to the public \Yelfare unless he
kno,vs the applicant.
Further he is required to determine whether or, not
the applicant has the financial ability to p~erfect the application. Sec. 100-3-8 expressly so provides. If the application Gan stand of record in one name and yet be
owned by someone else it is a fraud on the State Engineer. An application held by a large corporation might
readily be approved even though the proposed plan of
development were costly and, on the other
_, hand, be denied if it were known to be held by someone who was a
bankrupt or a S'p:eculator.
The State Engineer has to determine whether or
not the approval of an application will create or tend to
create a monopoly. This can only he known if the ap:plicant or owner of the application is known. There< are
literally dozens of similar p:roblems all of which require
that the applicant be known.
Further the State Engineer is required by statute
to investigate an application to ascertain whether or not
the lands to he irrigated are suitable for irrigation. It
is unlikely that the State Engineer would approve an ap . .
plication to irrigate the lands covered by the original_ application. The court records. will show that this ap;plication was pending in the office of the State Engineer without approval from the summer of 1945 until the applicaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion was approved in March of 1947. See defendant's Exhibit "C." It was only approved after the apparent record o'vner had filed a change application showing an intention to irrigate a different tract of land. The record
in this case indicates that the plaintiff McGarry is a real
estate agent and that he has dealt with the sale of land
and the appropriation of water in the office of the State
Engineer. He might well have occupied an entirely different position in the eyes of the State Engineer had the
application been fi.led in his name, or had it been transferred to his name before approval.
l\fcGarry in this case caused the application originally to be filed in the name of Hintzen even though he had
some contract by which he, McGarry, attempted to retain some control over the application which Hintzen
filed. Nothing was done to bring this fact situation to the
attention of the State Engineer. Thereafter Hintzen purported to assign the water right to 1\fcGarry and McGarry continued to let the record show that Hintzen owned
the water_ right. Thompson, as a member of the ·public,
came and examined the records in the office of the State
Engineer. From those public records, which, by Sec. 1003-18, impart notice to the world of their contents, Thompson ascertained that Hintzen was the owner of record.
He paid $800 in service to acquire the application. Thereafter he recorded his application and for all the State
Engineer knew he was the owner thereof. He filed an
ap•plication to change the point of diversion and the place
of use and this change was granted and permission was
given to dri]l a well.
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It """ould be an open and palpable fraud on the office
of the State Engineer an'd on Thon1pson to per1nit McGarry to obtain an approved application in this manner.
Such a procedure deprives the State Engineer of the opportu~it.y to investigate the various things which the
Legislature has told him by Sec. 100-3-8 to investigate.
It is contrary both to the spirit and to the letter of
the law to permit ~IcGarry to be the secret owner of this
application and have the State Engineer approve the application after investigating the financial responsibility
and other matters relatng to Thompson. McGarry gets
an approved application because of the financial picture
and other pictures ·presented by Thompson; he gets an
approved application for a tract of land which may have
been, in the opinion of the State Engineer, unfit for cultivation. It has deprived the State Engineer of an opportunity even to investigate such conditions. It is contrary to the holding of the Utah SupTeme Court and of
the United States Sup:reme Court. If this opinion of the
lower court be affirmed it will. constitute a license to
speculators to cause applications to stand of· record in
the name of dirt farmers in hopes that the same will be
approved while knowing that they might not ever be approved if they stand in the name of the speculator. 'This,
of course, could be done ·anyway, but if the speculator
elects to ~onceal the fact of ownership: from the State
Engineer and from the public he should bear the burden
and the risk of loss because some innocent third party
purchased the water right not knowing of the secretly
reserved interest.
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Such is exactly what is hap·pening in the instant
case. Thompson examined the records to ascertain who
the true owner was. McGarry, for reasons not reflected
in the record, elected to conceal the fact of ownership by
him. Tho1npson expended $800 to acquire a right and all
the time was dealing with the record owner. The StatE~
Engineer followed the la~t enunciated policy of the State
Supren1e Court set forth in the Wells-Fargo case and
treated Thompson as the owner. By so considering
Thompson to be the owner the State Engineer approved
an application vvhich might never have been approved
l1ad it remained on the old land and in the name of McGarry.
CONCLUSION
The obvious pattern of the Utah statute is to make
the office of the state engineer a place of rooord for
water rights. Before the office of the state engineer was
created there was much informality in transfers of
water rights and in their recordation. See for exampre
Kinney on Water Law, page 1769. Existing statutes require that the st-ate engineer be given a record of any
transfer of a water right which is recorded in the office
of the county recorder. All perfected rights must by express statute be recorded or th-ey ar,e void as to subsequent purchasers. s,ection 100-3-18 permits the transfer
of an unperfected right; provides for its recordation, and
also provides that when recorded it will impart constructive notice to the entire world. Th-ese statutes are designed to make of public record all wat-er rights .and all
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transfers of "\Vater rights. An exactly ~parallel situation
was presented prior to 1874 in the recordation of transfers of land. The statute as it then existed did not expressly require recordation. It contained no provision
to the effect that a failure to record would render the
transfer void as to a subsequent purchaser. It even failed
to provide that an instrument recorded thereunder would
i1npart constructive notice. Our Utah Court and the
United States Supreme Court both held that it must
necessarily be presumed from such a statute that an instrument recorded thereunder would impart constructive notice and further that the failure to record would
render the transaction void as to a subsequent ·purchaser
without actual notice. The holding by these two courts is
in accord with usual rules of construction of statutes
which provide for recordation. That philosophy is that
recording statutes are remedial and were designed to
protect bona fide purchasers and that they should be
liberally construed to that end. There is no sense whatever in t~e provision of Sec. 100-3-18 making recordation
constructive notice to the whole world unless the failure
to record will carry with it the consequence of losing the
right as against subsequent purchasers. Such is the exact
basis of the opinion by the United States Supreme Court.
After noting that the statute failed to declare a penalty
for failure to record in favor of a bona fide ·purchaser
the court expressly said that ''the implication is very
strong that the latter effect must be intentional otherwise
what value and purpose is there in construing the recordation to be constructive notice of its contents, except to
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protect such a purchaser.'' Since such a square holding
is found from our own Supreme Court, affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court, and in complete harmony
both w:ith the administrative ·practice of the state engineer and the spirit of recordation statutes, we think it
not necessary to go to the cases from other states.

PART IV
WAS THE WATER APPURTENANT TO THE
LAND
It is noted from part of the brief filed by defendant
Thompson that the question of whether or not the water
was appurtenant to McGarry's land is of some importance. In this regard we wish to note that this Supreme
Court has held in a suit to which the state engineer was
a party that an undrilled well could not be appurtenant
to land. (See Duchesne County v. Humphreys, 106 Utah
332, 148 P. 2d 338). Further, it has been unequivocally
held that water owned by one party cannot be appurtenant to land owned by another. In the instant" case the
land was owned by McGarry and the application was
filed by Hintzen for use on McGarry's land. With such
a diversity of ownership the water could not have been
appurtenant to the land even had the well been drilled.
Such was the holding of the Utah court in the case of
Utah Metal & Tunnel Co. v. Groesbeck, 62 Utah 251, 219
P. 248. The water was not .appurtenant to the land and
Thom·pson should not be held to have received any constructive notice based upon some erroneous concept that
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the water \Vas appurtenant to the McGarry land. If he
lmew the la,Y, and he \vas presumed to know it, he would
have lmo,vn that since the well had not been drilled it
"~as not appurtenant to nfcGarry's land, and would like'vise have kno'vn that the transfer (giving back) of the
land by Hintzen to )IcGarry would not carry with it any
'vater right because the water was not appurtenant to the
land.
R~spectfully

submitted,

ELIAS HANSEN
Attorr~Aey for App~ellamt,
Jerold E. Thomp-s~on

GROVER A. GILE·s,
.Attoirney General
EDWARD W. CLYDE,
Sp·ecial Ass't. Atilorney Gener,al,
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State Engilneer of Utah.
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